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The present paper aims to proceed to a succinct analysis of Leibniz’s Principles of 
Nature and Grace (section 5), by exploiting the cardinal arguments acquainted in it – 
namely, is he human distinguishable from the animal thanks to his capacity of being 
endowed with rationality? Henceforth, for answering this question, the herewith 
paper obeys to a linear analysis and presents a corpus structured in three main parts. 
The first two parts aims to highlight the text, through furnishing explanations on the 
main concepts and concerns, while the third part of the corpus offers at prima facie a 
criticism towards the Leibnizian principle – according to which humans are rational 
– in order to finally strengthen this latter principle, by emphazing that there are no 
solid disparagements (confutatio) towards it.  
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“It has been said that man is a rational animal. All my life I have been searching for 
evidence which could support this.”  Bertrand Russell. 
“Man is a rational animal”, dixit Aristotle, this sentence recovers two domains of 
abilities - of qualitative capacities. It expresses the fact that first, the human is an 
animal, in the sense that he is able to move himself and second - beyond this physical 
capacity and anatomical characteristic - the human is also capable of thinking, of 
reasoning and is ipso facto endowed with a mind. To use the Cartesian terminology, to 
the extend to which the human is able to move, through being endowed with a 
material corpus, this latter constitutes the human’s res extenso part, while with regard 
to the capacity of affording to cogitate, through being endowed with reason, this 
latter constitutes the human’s res cogitans part. Furthermore, the human’s rational 
character and rationality comes from the way he founds the knowledge. Indeed, each 
human’s knowledge is based on the reason, in opposition to the experience, “the 
characteristic of the reason’s movement and intelligence is to give its limit to itself 
and to be never overcome by senses and instinct” (Aurèle 1999). 
Throughout the section number five of Principles of Nature and Grace [1], Leibniz 
enumerates the existing differences between the human and the animal, differences 
which put forward the fact that the human is a homo rationalis. Now, the aim of the 
herewith paper is to critically explore and explain the principal issues surrounding 
the provided arguments, by Leibniz, in order to sustain the differentia between 
humans and animals and de facto prove the affirmation of the human being a rational 
animal. 
1. Analogy between the perceptions of animals and the reasoning of 
humans 
The animals, entities equipped with an apparatus of reasoning or with just a simple 
primitive draft? 
“The perceptions of ·non-human· animals are interconnected in a way that has 
some resemblance to reason. But ·it differs from reason because· it is grounded only 
in the memory of facts or effects, and not at all in the knowledge of causes. That is 
what happens when a dog shrinks from the stick with which it has been beaten 
because memory represents to it the pain the stick has caused.”[1]. Through the 
observation that there is an analogy between the perception of animals and the 
reason of humans, animals are thus not identified to a kind of machines which are 
living only in the present moment. Consequently, does the Leibnizian connectedness 
reveal the presence of a conscience or the presence of the reason, of the mind?  




In the case of animals, what are connected are perceptions and no ideas. Thanks to 
the connections, the perceptions of these animals do not remain insulated each from 
another, but are forming a coherent ensemble which leads to a pertinent behaviour. If 
for instance A is calling his cat to come, this cat will come (if of course, the material 
and contextual conditions were met: the cat must be in proximity etc…). However, it 
would be wrong to say that through this process animals are able to afford 
reasoning, because first the animals are not conscious of this process and 
subsequently, they are not able to direct and control it: what is a conscious process 
for the human beings is not for the animal. To sustain it, an example might be useful: 
a group of sheep is followed by a wolf. This latter feels the danger and in order to 
escape it, the leader of the group will throw itself in a river all the others will do the 
same. Here the cheeps obey to a gregarious spirit and to connections between 
perceptions (the fear, the wolf, and the escape) but they do not analyse the case in 
which they find themselves, they just physiologically react. They can react only 
physiologically and only in a same kind of way, because their perceptions are 
derived from their experience, thus because of the limitation of the latter, their 
reactions will be predictable but not reasoned. (We might predict that the sheeps will 
try to escape the wolf, but the way they have chosen is irrational, because this way 
leads to the death too.) 
Thus, although there is a resemblance between these connected perceptions and 
the reasoning, the resemblance lies in the external behaviour and not in the 
clarification of a conscious reasoning. The dog will run away when he will see the 
stick only because there is an unconscious representation of the senses and of the 
imagination. The dog proceeds to connections between perceptions (the view of the 
stick, the angry voice of the master) which will remind him (the dog) to a previous 
situation such as this one - there is a mark in the memory which leads the dog to 
adopt mimicry with regard to itself. (The dog knows that in the previous four cases 
(except the first one) he run away, so it will do exactly the same action, it will imitate 
its own past actions.) It appears that the memory provides a consecution to the 
animals which imitate the reasoning of the humans, but animals can only imitate this 
reason, offering an analogon rationis. Animals are thus passing from a present image 
to an impression of which effect still subsists, without the intermediation of objective 
nexuses.  
The Humans, entities which principally use the perceptions of animals, when they 
undertake actions, and which neglect the use of reasoning, or beings which are enough 
rational in order to choose the appropriate “tool” for the appropriate “action”? 
“In fact human beings, to the extent that they are empirics - which is to say in 
three quarters of what they do - act just like non-human animals.”[1]. There is an 
extension of the animal behaviour to the human one: most of the situations in front of 




which a human finds himself do not require reasoning. For instance when I am 
fitting my shoes, am I reasoning in which shoe to put my left feet? No, because there 
is a mechanical action. So, most of the occurring situations call fast answers and 
diagrammatic connections of ideas. Although, most of the time humans will act as 
animals - by using the perceptions and by proceeding to unconscious 
gestures/actions - this does not imply that humans are not rational beings. On the 
contrary, the fact that they might choose the best apparatus for the occurring situation 
can be interpreted as showing that even in such cases where they use perceptions - 
and it seems that they don’t use reasoning - they use reason in fact. Indeed, the fact 
that in a fraction of seconds, the human being will know what to do, in order to 
maximise the profit, underlines the rationally constructed reason with which humans 
are endowed . Nevertheless, in actions such as previously listed, the reflexive 
rationality of actions is hidden by the practical rationality of the satisfaction of the 
need. 
The astronomer and the ordinary individual, a differentiation in the used “tool” which 
leads to a primal characterization of what reason is?   
“An ‘empiric’ is someone who goes by obvious superficial regularities and 
similarities without asking ‘Why?’ about any of them. For example, we expect there 
to be daylight tomorrow because we have always experienced it that way; only an 
astronomer foresees it in a reasoned way (and even his prediction will prove wrong 
some day, when the cause of daylight goes out of existence).” [1]. The comparison 
between the astronomer and the ordinary individual highlights two points. First it 
underlines that a scientist passes the bridge from the practice to the reasoning - to the 
knowledge of the causes. Although this passing the bridge action, a relativization of the 
rationality of the astronomer’s knowledge occurs - owing the fact that his knowledge 
is based on transitory causes.  The second point focuses on the fact that the 
astronomer foresees whereas ordinary humans do expect. This underscores the 
dissimilarities between the objective undertake of the astronomer and the subjective 
attitude of the ordinary individual - the scientist founds his prevision on a whole 
theory, on the Cartesian longues chaînes de raison, whereas the ordinary individual 
founds his attempt on the practice, thanks to the memory of the facts. This 
comparison also conduces to a first definition of the reason: perception, memory, 
reasoning, all these three terms are constituents of a first characterization of the 
reason, which constitutes an intrinsic human activity.  
2. Reason, a main characteristic which differentiate Humans from 
animals 
Reason, perception and necessary or eternal truths, an inseparable triangular 
combination?   




“But genuine reasoning depends on necessary or eternal truths like those of logic, 
arithmetic and geometry, which make indubitable connections between ideas and 
reach conclusions that can’t fail to be true.” [1]. The content of the propositions of the 
scientist is true but applies to a given moment and a given context, thus this content 
remains relative to this moment and context because the world is constantly 
changing (the studies on the climate done 60 years ago are for most of them no 
longer valid). So, a purely rational statement must have an absolute value with a 
universal aiming, thus remaining true independently of the moment or the context. 
“Water boils at 100°C” is a scientific statement because it is valid everywhere on the 
earth. The logic structure of the reasoning is making part of these eternal truths - a 
logical proposition (the non-contradiction for instance) will preserve its value of true 
whatever the moment or the context. Thus, rationality and reason are due more to 
the form of the procedure, of the approach rather to their informative content. In 
addition, the reason, the perception and the necessary or eternal truths are strongly 
united and in fact, reason corresponds to the capacity of perceiving these necessary or 
eternal truths.  
The eternal truths, the emergence of the distinction between human beings and animals? 
“Animals that never think of such propositions are called ‘brutes’; but ones that 
recognise such necessary truths are rightly called rational animals, and their souls are 
called minds.”[1]. The knowledge of eternal truths is crucial for applying the distinguo 
between human beings and animals. Thanks to this knowledge, human beings are 
raised to the knowledge of themselves – to the cogito ergo sum - and this is what is 
called minds. These eternal truths are enabling us to proceed to reflexive acts. By 
reflexive acts (or acts of reflexion) it is insinuated that the human has to connect the 
problem he/she faces with former assets. The act of reflexion refers to the building of 
a connection between a present evocation - the problem - and a former evocation - 
the previous knowledge.  
So, the privilege of rational animals is their power of making these connections, 
their power of reasoning. The applied connections corresponds to virtual 
propositions in report to which the rational animals can situate their actions. Confer 
the example with the cheeps. If the cheeps would be rational animals, than they would 
make a connection between their presently perceptions, they would be able to place 
them in a new context, into which they would situate their actions: the wolf, the fear, 
the escape and the river. However, the escape doesn’t mean anything else than the 
wolf. Thus if these cheeps would be rational, they would be able to weigh the data in 
front of which they find themselves. Thus, a rational animal is rational if he/she is 
able to proceed to a calculation of consequences (what if, I throw myself in the river, 
owing the fact that I do not know how to swim?). In conclusion, animals are not 
rational and thus have not minds, or even if they would be endowed with minds, they 




would not be confusable with the humans’ minds, because their faculties and 
possibilities are barely lower.  
From the intuition to the abstraction and consequently the passage from the man as an 
“animal” to the man as a “rational animal”? 
“These souls are capable of reflective acts - ·acts of attention to their own inner 
states· - so that they can think about what we call ‘myself’, substance, soul, or mind: 
in a word, things and truths that are immaterial. This is what renders us capable of 
science, or of demonstrable knowledge.” [1]. The intuition refers to the immediate 
perception without the recourse to reason, whereas, the abstraction implies the 
recourse to reason. The abstraction recovers the following points: first, the abstract is 
the separated by opposition to the whole, abstracting is making a separation. For 
instance, I can consider a window, abstraction made of what I can see through it. 
Second, the abstract is the general in report to the particular. The abstract permits to 
seize common characteristics. For example, all the humans have something in 
common.  
An animal as a human is provided with sensory organs thanks to which he can 
perceive. But as shown above, this animal can only perceive, without being able to 
make connections among and between his perceptions. Whereas, a human when he 
is rational, is able to proceed to this connections; his mind can interpose between his 
perceptions real connections. Thus, the abstraction is the result of an act of the mind 
and an animal is capable of intuition and a rational animal (a human) is capable of 
abstraction.   
Furthermore, what shows that animals are incapable of proceeding to the 
abstraction might be illustrated through an example. To go back to the cheeps, these 
cheeps were incapable to proceed to the second point of the abstraction. In their case, 
there was a wolf and the river, these cheeps were incapable to seize the common 
characteristic between both, the common characteristic being the death (the first 
death consisted in being eaten by the wolf, the second consisted in being drown in 
the river).  
3. Some real limits, or only seemingly limits to the Leibnizian 
principles?  
The empirical perspective, a reason subjected to the experience and consequently a reason 
subjected to the perceptions? 
In the empirical perspective, the knowledge is based on the experience and 
according to Hume, all our ideas proceeds from the experience. However, in such a 
case, is the human still distinguishable from the animal? Can we still claim that the 
human is rational?  




Yes, we can. First, the humans are drawing ideas from their experience. Second, the 
realm of the experience is reduced because the human is not able to explore 
everything (can we explore the sun? Assuredly no, but it is not a synonymous of the 
fact that we do not know what the sun is etc), but the realm of the knowledge is vast. 
So, it proves that the human used empirical data, used his perception, in order to 
proceed to combinations, in order to make connections and thus, he used his reason. 
By using his reason, the human can access to what cannot be experienced. Thus, the 
reason is no more subjected to the experience and becomes a prolongation of it. This 
is illustrated through induction. The inductive inference consists in establishing a 
general hypothesis from a number of particular cases. Saying that every star is white 
is an induction, because there is a generalization of a regularity/main characteristic 
to a whole class of objects (the stars) of which most could not be observed.  
The “à priori” logic, a final argument which leads to the support of the idea that “Human 
is a rational animal”. 
As demonstrated above, the human beings are interposing between their 
perceptions, connections. These connections refer to a à priori logic (which 
corresponds to a data formed before the experience, which doesn’t base itself on the 
experience (Lalande, 2006)). So, if the human bases his connections on a à priori logic, 
subsequently he does not base them on the experience, on the perceptions. Thus, we 
might advance as argument that the human is rational, because in the absence of any 
past experience, he can afford to make combinations of ideas, to proceed to 
connections and henceforth to discover causes. There is no heteronomy of the reason, 
in the sense that this latter obeys to the external laws imposed by the experience.     
After analyse of Leibniz’s principle expressed in a modus pensere, it appears clearly 
that animals are not equipped with rationality (and even if it would be the case, their 
rationality would be so low and hidden by the practical desire of satisfaction of a 
goal, that it would not have any perspective of development), whereas the human 
beings are equipped with it. Through the transformation of his soul into a mind, and 
through the capacity to proceed to connections between the perceptions, the human 
acquires the statute of rational animal.  
Nevertheless, there might be an objection to the idea that the “Human is a rational 
animal”, indeed, when the human is in interaction with others, does he continue to 
be rational, doesn’t his egoistic and particularistic desires override his rational 
character: “We know the human is a reasonable animal, but the humans are 
they?”(Aron, 1960).   
  
  






Leibniz, G., W., 2003, Principles of Nature and Grace, section 5, in Philosophical 
Works of Leibniz, Montana: Kessinger Publishing. 
Aurèle, M., 1999, Pensées pour Moi-Même, Livre VII, Paris : Flammarion. 
Lalande, A., 2006, Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie, Paris : Presses 
Universitaires de France. 
Aron, R., 1960, Penser la Liberté, Penser la Démocratie, Paris : Quarto Gallimard. 
 
